May 14, 2025
Re: Appeal of Final Local Determination
Taxpayer: *****
Locality Assessing Tax: ****
Business Tangible Personal Property Tax
Dear *****:
This final state determination is issued upon the administrative appeal filed by you on behalf of your client, ***** (the “Taxpayer”), with the Department of Taxation. You appeal an assessment of business tangible personal property (BTPP) tax issued to the Taxpayer by the ***** (the “County”) for the 2019 tax year.
The BTPP tax is imposed and administered by local officials. Virginia Code § 58.1-3983.1 D authorizes the Department to issue determinations on taxpayer appeals of BTPP tax assessments. On appeal, a BTPP tax assessment is deemed prima facie correct, i.e., the local assessment will stand unless the taxpayer proves that it is incorrect.
The following determination is based on the facts presented to the Department summarized below. The Code of Virginia sections cited are available online at law.lis.virginia.gov. The public documents cited are available at tax.virginia.gov in the Laws, Rules & Decisions section of the Department’s website.
FACTS
The Taxpayer operated data centers in the County. The data centers housed server racks that various suppliers (the “Rack Sellers”) had assembled according to the Taxpayer’s specifications and sold to the Taxpayer. The Taxpayer recorded the purchase price paid to a Rack Seller for a server rack as the asset’s cost.
The Taxpayer also had agreements with manufacturers of various server components (the “Component Manufacturers”), which provided for cash payments from the Component Manufacturers to the Taxpayer. Each payment equaled the difference between the price the Taxpayer paid to a Rack Seller for a component included in a specific server rack and a lower price that was negotiated in advance by the Taxpayer and the Component Manufacturer. The Taxpayer recorded such payments as separate negative asset entries that were associated with the respective server racks. In determining its taxable cost basis for BTPP tax in the County, the Taxpayer reduced the purchase price of server racks located in the County by their associated negative asset entries.
Under audit, the County disallowed the negative asset entries. The Taxpayer appealed the adjustment to the County, asserting that the cash payments were rebates which should reduce the purchase price of the assets. In its final determination, the County upheld the adjustment on the basis that the Taxpayer did not prove that the cash payments issued by the Component Manufacturers were intended as a reduction in the purchase price of the server racks. The Taxpayer appeals to the Department, claiming that the negative entries represent rebates that should reduce the taxable cost basis of the related assets for purposes of the BTPP tax.
ANALYSIS
New Information Submitted with the Appeal
The Taxpayer has provided voluminous exhibits in an effort to substantiate its claims. The County takes issue with much of this evidence, for different reasons. Some of the exhibits, for example, contain spreadsheets purportedly evidencing transactions between the Taxpayer and the Rack Sellers and the Component Manufacturers. The County urges the Department to ignore this evidence on the basis that it must be validated. The County also asserts that the Department should not consider any information that the Taxpayer had not previously provided to the County.
The administrative appeals process outlined in Virginia Code § 58.1-3983.1 and in the Guidelines for Appealing Local Business Taxes (the “Guidelines”), issued as P.D. 04-28 (6/25/2004) was implemented to give taxpayers and localities an adjudication process that was less formal and less burdensome on the parties than litigating in the court system. Administrative appeals are not governed, for example, by the same rules of evidence that would exist for litigation in court. In addition, taxpayers are not required to prove their case beyond any reasonable doubt, as the government must do when prosecuting a criminal matter. Administrative appeals are civil matters in which a taxpayer satisfies its evidentiary burden of proof based on a preponderance of the evidence, a much lower standard. See Public Document (P.D.) 13-224 (12/13/2013) and P.D. 15-145 (6/30/2015).
Accordingly, as with any administrative appeal, the Department will evaluate the case with reference to all of the facts and circumstances presented to determine whether the Taxpayer’s factual claims are more likely than not to be true, and if taken as true, what the outcome is under the applicable law.
Fair Market Value
All tangible personal property, unless declared intangible under the provisions of Virginia Code § 58.1-1100, et. seq., is reserved for local taxation by Article X, § 4 of the Constitution of Virginia. Article X, § 1 and § 2 of the Constitution of Virginia provide that all property, unless specifically exempted within the provisions of the Constitution, shall be taxed at a uniform rate among classes, and that “all assessments of real estate and tangible personal property shall be at their fair market value to be ascertained as prescribed by general law.” This provision of the Constitution contains the presumption that the General Assembly’s prescribed valuation method will both standardize valuation practices across all the local governments in the Commonwealth and result in something approximating fair market value. Virginia Code § 58.1-3103 specifically charges local commissioners with the responsibility of assessing property at fair market value.
Fair market value is generally defined as the price a property will bring when offered by one who desires, but is under no obligation, to sell it, and the buyer has no immediate necessity to purchase it. See Tuckahoe Women’s Club v. County of Richmond, 119 Va. 734 (1958). If the valuation methodology employed by a locality results in an assessment well above fair market value, the locality may use another methodology prescribed in Virginia Code § 58.1-3507 B. See P.D. 05-129 (8/3/2005).
Virginia Code § 58.1-3503 A 18 specifies that, for most items of tangible personal property that are used in a trade or business, fair market value is to be ascertained either by a percentage or percentages of original cost. The General Assembly has not provided a definition for the term “original cost” within the context of Virginia Code § 58.1-3507 B. Absent a statutory definition, the plain and ordinary meaning of the term is controlling. See Samson v. Board of Supervisors, 257 Va. 589 (1999). “Original cost” typically refers to the net invoice price for an asset, which necessarily assumes that is the amount paid and capitalized.
The term “original cost” has consistently been interpreted to mean the cost paid by the original purchaser from a manufacturer or dealer. See 2009 Op. Va. Att’y Gen. 18 and 2014 Op. Va. Att’y Gen. 20. The Department has held that original cost includes all costs incurred for putting the property in use, i.e., the total sum of money the buyer parts with to get the article. See P.D. 08-85 (6/6/1985) and P.D. 14-68 (5/21/2014). See also S. & L. Straus Beverage Corporation v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 185 Va. 1055 (1947). In addition, Virginia Code § 58.1-3518 provides that the original cost reported on a taxpayer’s annual BTTP return “should be the original capitalized cost or the cost that would have been capitalized if the expense deduction in lieu of depreciation was elected under § 179 of the Internal Revenue Code.”
Rebates
In P.D. 22-130 (8/24/2022), the Department opined that a business may reduce the taxable cost basis of assets subject to BTPP tax by rebates received from a manufacturer where the facts and circumstances and the parties’ intent indicate the rebate was intended as a reduction to the purchase price of the asset, or class of assets, at issue. The Department stated further that the facts and circumstances of the particular transaction and the parties’ true intent, however, must be examined to determine whether a payment labelled by the parties as a rebate is actually something else entirely. For example, if the “rebate” is paid by a third party and not the seller or where the payment is made in advance of the purchase, the “rebate” may not reflect an adjustment to the purchase price. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Milk Co. v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 707 (1956), John R. Wentz, et ux. v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 1 (1995), and IRS Technical Advice Memorandum (TAM) 9719005 (1997).
In this case, the agreements between the Taxpayer and the Component Manufacturers designated the payments as rebates and indicated that they were intended to provide the Taxpayer with an agreed upon price in cases where the Taxpayer paid a Rack Seller more than the agreed upon price for a given server component. In addition, the agreements were entered into before the Taxpayer contracted with a Rack Seller for a specific server rack and served as an inducement for the Taxpayer to require the Rack Seller to use parts provided by the Component Manufacturer. If the payment had not been provided, the Taxpayer may not have required that the Rack Seller include that specific part or may have required a part from a different manufacturer.
The Taxpayer provided affidavits from senior management stating that the payments were intended to reduce the purchase price paid by the Taxpayer for server racks that included specifically identified components of the Component Manufacturers. The Taxpayer also submitted an electronic mail from one Component Manufacturer verifying the parties’ intent and stating that it was standard industry practice to employ nonpublic, back-end rebates to individual customers to maintain pricing confidentiality.
In the Department’s opinion, the information provided is sufficient to establish that the Taxpayer and the Component Manufacturers intended the payments to serve as a reduction to the cost of the server racks purchased from the Rack Sellers. This conclusion is consistent with the federal income tax treatment of similar third-party payments. See, e.g., Brown v. Commissioner, 10 B.T.A 1036 (1928), Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1977-429, and Announcement 2024-19, 2024-17 I.R.B. 950.
The Taxpayer provided substantial documentation detailing its treatment of the rebates with respect to an example server rack. The Taxpayer demonstrated that the tax basis of the server rack was comprised of two assets, namely, a positive asset representing the purchase price paid to the Rack Seller and a negative asset representing the rebate payment received from the Component Manufacturer. The two assets were inextricably linked in the Taxpayer’s tax accounting software, were depreciated in the same manner, and were accounted for together upon disposition. In the Department’s opinion, the Taxpayer provided sufficient tracking data to establish that the original capitalized cost of that server rack for tax purposes was equal to the purchase price paid to the Rack Seller less the rebate payment received from the Component Manufacturer.
County’s Arguments
The County argues that the amounts paid by the Component Manufacturers are not rebates that should reduce the taxable cost basis of the Taxpayer’s assets located in the County for several reasons. The Department will address each of the County’s arguments below.
Third Party Payments
The County asserts that because the payments were made pursuant to agreements between the Taxpayer and the Component Manufacturers to which the Rack Sellers were not a party, the payments do not qualify as rebates of the purchase price paid to the Rack Sellers. The County cites P.D. 22-130 in support of its assertion. In P.D. 22-130, the Department stated that a third-party payment may not reflect an adjustment to the purchase price. The Department, however, did not rule out that such payments may qualify as rebates if that was the parties’ true intent based on the facts and circumstances of the particular transaction. As stated above, the facts and circumstances in this case support a finding that the rebates were intended as a reduction of the purchase price.
Financing
The County and the Taxpayer appear to agree that the original capitalized cost of a server rack is the appropriate basis for assessing BTPP tax. The County, however, points out that the Taxpayer financed its purchases of the server racks with capital lease agreements and that the amounts financed equaled the purchase price paid to the Rack Seller. The County then cites FASB Standard No. 6 and Topic 842 for the proposition that assets purchased with a finance lease must be capitalized on the lessee’s books at the present value of the lease payments. This argument, however, fails to recognize that the treatment of an item on a taxpayer’s books for financial accounting purposes does not necessarily control its treatment for tax purposes. See generally, Thor Power Tool v. Commissioner, 439 U. S. 522, 542 (1979). In any event, the effect, if any, that a financing arrangement may have on the original capitalized cost of an asset has no bearing on the separate and distinct question of whether a later rebate should reduce such cost.
Availability of Rebate
The County further argues that the payments from the Component Manufacturer’s were not rebates because they were not widely available to other purchasers and were not disclosed to the Rack Sellers. These points, however, have no bearing on whether the agreements between the Taxpayer and the Component Manufacturers provided for payments that were intended by the parties as a reduction to the price paid by the Taxpayer for the server racks.
DETERMINATION
Based on its review of the information provided, in the Department’s opinion, the Taxpayer has adequately established that the intent and effect of the payments from the Component Manufacturers was to provide a reduction in the purchase price of the related server racks. As such, the payments would qualify as rebates that reduce the original cost of the asset for purposes of the BTTP tax. In addition, the Department finds that the Taxpayer adequately tracked and tied the positive and negative asset entries for an example server rack. Further, the Department is persuaded that the Taxpayer’s internal recordkeeping was sufficient to tie the positive asset entries for the vast majority of the assets to their respective negative asset entries; however, the quantity of data at issue is too voluminous for the Department to perform verification beyond the example asset addressed during the course of the appeal.
The Department is remanding this case to the County to adjust its assessment for the 2019 tax year in accordance with this determination. If the County determines that it needs additional documentation to associate specific negative asset entries with specific positive asset entries on the 2019 BTTP tax return, it must request the specific documentation required and allow the Taxpayer 60 days to provide it, unless the Taxpayer and the County mutually agree to a different deadline. Once the Taxpayer has submitted the documentation and the County has had the opportunity to review it, the County must issue a revised final determination. If the Taxpayer disagrees with the results of that determination, it may appeal to the Department within 90 days of the final determination.
If you have any questions regarding this determination, you may contact ***** in the Office of Tax Policy and Legal Affairs, Tax Adjudication and Resolution Division, at ***** or *****.
Sincerely,
Kristin L. Collins
Deputy Tax Commissioner
Commonwealth of Virginia
AR/5021.X